Ailments of linkori. Oleksandr Khvorikh - Battleship in battle. Great and greedy. The axis of a short video about her combat robot

Annotation

A new book from the author of the bestseller "Dueling Aircraft Carriers"! The best research of a great historian of the fleet, which for all his professionalism reads like a sizzling adventure novel! The incredible benefits of remaking a battleship spanning several centuries - from wooden windbreaks to heavily armored ears of corn, which are produced by arrivals from another world!

Why has this class of ships changed more than once beyond recognition? Why in the 20th century did the linear fleets, on which astronomical sums were spent, fail to fulfill the hopes that had been placed on them, and the bet on a general artillery battle turned out to be a failure? Is it true that the battleships once surrendered to the first aircraft carriers - did the missile armor give them a new life? And why should we watch the damned “reincarnation” of the battleship as soon as possible?

This book allows us to take a fresh look at the past, today and tomorrow, of the most dangerous warships in history - the ultimate isolation of naval power.

Oleksandr Gennadiyovich Khvorikh

Paradoxies of history

Not quite armadillos and not at all battleships

Zgubniy influx

Rukh u temryava

Textbook war

Way to the top

Actors of a different plan

All roads lead down

Naval battles near Washington and London

Raiders, you are very great!

Standing at the port

There are not many battleships

Two and a half fight

King ta yogo spadkoemets

Another, third, fourth attack

How did the stinks drown?

Bibliography

Oleksandr Gennadiyovich Khvorikh

Linkori in battle. Great and greedy

Paradoxies of history

As soon as the famous historian Siegfried Breuer begins to tell the history of the battleship from prehistoric times, it seems that God himself ordered us to inherit his butt. For example, the first battle in which the “ships of the line” of that era played a major role was the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC. The famous Athenian Trieries were the prehistoric ships of the line. Before the speech, the battle of Salamis itself is connected with the first part of the mysteries of military-naval history. Do you remember how the course of this battle in most important areas unfolded? The cunning Themistocles lured the Persians to the narrow channel, and the Persians could not exploit their great numerical superiority, and the important Persian ships could not maneuver, and the Greek trio imposed important losses on the Persian fleet. Recently, historians raised a reasonable question: did the Persians capture important ships? And they gave a completely different description of the battle. The cunning Themistocles lured the Persians to the narrow channel, and the important Greek ships were steamrolled by light Persian ships, and most of them by the mobilized merchant ships of the Phoenicians. Who's right? Well, now we hardly know.

It was a good idea to put a ship of the line ahead of a ship, becoming a rowing vessel - a trio, or a penter, or a ram, and the main tactical technique in naval battles was to drive a ram. Unfortunately, the old “artillery” of the ballista and catapults was so inaccurate and weak that it could sink ships. True, during the Punic Wars, the Romans, who had clearly surrendered to the Carthaginians from the naval forces, found an original way to turn the naval war into a land war. The stench of the boarding place that I hear is called “raven”. As a result, the battle turned into a series of boarding battles, as the Roman legionaries won due to obvious superiority. This is the first, but not the last, failure, if the tactics gave a crap back.

For a long time the oar was weighed down by the head, and the slaves - by the wreck of the ship. And the battle of Lepanto in 1571 is no less famous, because two thousand years after Salamis, everyone carried out the same crests of the ship, and now the stench was transferred to the galleries. And then the ship’s axle gave a sharp jerk, and for the hour of the Anglo-Dutch wars there was a residual oar hanging, which is not surprising - in the vast expanses of the ocean you don’t really swing an oar. Until that time, the military ships were still strengthened by the reinforced merchant ships, and a salvage ship of the line appeared, still sailing, and artillery became the main armor. The first specially commissioned artillery ship was the English carrack Mary Rose. Then the history of rowing ships repeated itself - at the sad hour, the entire evolution of the lineal ship increased to an increase in size due to the presence of any obvious changes.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the old battleship reached the limiting dimensions that wooden shipbuilding allowed. 100-garmat battleships became the culmination of its development at this stage. Before speaking, during the Napoleonic wars, a record was set for the number of battleships of one type. The first attempts at standardization were made by the Spaniards during the operation of their West Indian galleons, but the first step in this galusia belongs to the French. The French designer Jacques Sané completed the design of a 74-gauge battleship, which from 1782 to 1813 laid down 107 ships of this type! Before the speech, Sanya himself created a project, which was followed by the largest series of important battleships - the 118-garmat "Comers de Marseille" - 16 ships with a water capacity of 5100 tons. Before the speech, these ships were small enough to have their own armor - the thickness of the oak plating was 1.5 meters long, and not every core took it.

The era of the sailing battleship itself produced the most prominent naval commanders: de Ruyter, Jervis, Nelson, Suffren. The result of many wars centered on battles at sea, and the main role of these battles was played by the ship of the line. At an unfortunate hour, the battle turned into an artillery duel between two rear columns on parallel courses, and the tactical approach to cutting through the enemy’s formation was lost in a rare episode.

Everything flows, everything changes. The advent of the steam engine in the mid-19th century changed little in naval strategy and tactics; it lost nothing more than an additional mechanism due to the calm. A very serious blow to the proud inhabitants of the seas was the appearance of the bomb threat. The French general Peksan sharply increased the weight of the projectile, replacing the 36-pound core with a 68-pound explosive bomb, which a wooden ship could not withstand. The battle at Sinop in 1853 put a dent in this supernatural situation, after which it became clear to all the admirals: it was no longer possible to live like this!

But it was not the Russians who were the first to build up this army, but the Turks did not win the battle and did not lose; the organizational units went to the Fatherland bombing wars - in France. Before speaking, it’s even easier to explain. The Crimean War became the first war of the new era, since one of the major factors was the development of the industrial sector of the region, which supplied the armies with the current and most demanding military systems. And so on, then the grave official played a greater role. To fight Russian coastal batteries, the French produced a number of blended floating batteries, which demonstrated their combat value on June 17, 1855. This day is considered to be the first significant date in the history of the armored battleship, although before this day a number of fatalities were lost.

The offensive was broken and the land of the Received States was industrially apologised. At the hour of the Great War, a new type of ships - monitors - was created there, and the first battle of armored ships appeared. On the 9th of February 1862, at the Hampton roadstead, the Northern battleship "Monitor" and the casemate battleship of the inhabitants of the "Virginia" clashed. Let us not overstate the significance of this particular episode, and every single incident during this war took place in coastal waters or on rivers. It is possible to escape from enemy armored ships in the open sea without the risk of worthless seafaring. That armor, to be honest, was even more amazing.

The world itself is beginning to doubt the true significance of the French attempt to recapture the sea-going battleship, draped in forged blacks by climbing into their wooden ships. Still, the first operational military ship of the new generation was the British “Warrior”, which introduced two revolutionary changes before the ship was built: a sleek hull and rolled armored plates. This itself gives us the opportunity to call it the first real-life ship of the line in this sense.

On June 20, 1866, the first battle of armored fleets took place in the Adriatic Sea near the island of Lissa - no longer a simple battle between ships on the shore itself, but a real sea battle in the open sea. Alas, it’s a pity that this one got caught up in the development of tactics of armored fleets. The temporary weakness of the artillery prompted Admiral Tegetgoff to use the head of the ram, and this would be adopted by other fleets, unaffected by the Swedish clearly in the thorough supply of important ammunition. A paradoxical realization: a leap forward in the development of technology and a rollback in tactics.

From then until the end of the 19th century, admirals and shipbuilders tried to find the ideal type of battleship. A battery battleship, also called an armored frigate, because it had one solid deck, replacing the battleship with a central battery. Now the guards were not placed along the entire length of the deck from stem to stem, but rather in the central part of the hull, and the battery was covered from the late fire with armored traverses. Before speaking, how a single “relevant” battery battleship follows the French “Magenta”, how small are two harmonic decks.

The volume of new equipment, which has sharply increased, has led to a streak-like shortening of their strength, or...

Linear ships lost during the Second Light War, a complete list of ordering by date of destruction.

Battleship Royal Oak over water

1940 r_k

07/3/1940, French battleship "Brittany" sunk by British battleships "Hood", "Valiant", "Resolution" (Operation "Catapult")
10/14/40, the British battleship Royal Oak was sunk by the German submarine U-47
12.11.40 r. The Italian battleship Conte de Cavour was sunk by British torpedo bombers in the port.

...and under the water

1941 r_k

10.4.41, the Greek battleship "Kilkis" was sunk by German dive bombers in the port.
10.4.41 p., the Greek battleship "Lemnos" was sunk by German dive bombers in the port.
25.4.41 r. The British battleship Hood was sunk by the German battleship Bismarck in a night battle.
27.5.41 r. The German battleship Bismarck was sunk during the battle with the British King George V and Radni. There is a version that the main reason for the death of the Bismarck was the lack of ammunition by the crew.

Radyansky battleship "Marat"

29.9.41 r. Radyansky battleship "Marat" was sunk by a German dive bomber near the port. Zgod of changes to a floating battery.

The floating battery "Volkhov" - everything that was lost from the "Marat" - the bow part is all day long

21.11.44 r. The Japanese "Congo" was sunk by the American submarine "Si Lion".
11/25/41, the British “Barem” was torpedoed by the German submarine U-311.
12/7/41, the US battleship "Arizona" was sunk at the port during the attack of Japanese aircraft on Pearl Harbor.
12/7/41, the US battleship Oklahoma was sunk at the port during the attack of Japanese aircraft on Pearl Harbor.
12/10/41, the British "Prince of Wales" was sunk by Japanese aircraft.
12/10/41, the British "Repulse" was sunk by Japanese aircraft.
12/17/41, the German “Kishenkov battleship” “Admiral Graf Spee” due to the complete hopelessness of the battle with the British sinking squadron command.

Admiral Count Spee "zipsovaniye" by the powerful command

1942 r_k

11/13/42 r. Japanese battleship Hiei sunk by American aircraft.
11/15/42 r, Japanese "Kirishima" sank after a battle with the American battleship "Washington"

"Washington" is firing at "Kirisim"

1943 r_k

8.6.43 r., Japanese "Mutsu" bent through the bulge of the ammunition supply of the stern caliber.
9/9/43, the new Italian battleship Roma was destroyed by an English radio-coated bomb.
12/26/43 r. The German "Scharnhorst" perished during the battle with the British "Duke of York".

1944 r_k

10/24/44, the Japanese battleship Musashi sank during the Battle of the Philippines due to US naval aviation
10/25/44, the Japanese battleship "Fuso" during the Battle of the Philippines was destroyed in a battle with American battleships.
10/25/44, the Japanese battleship Yamashiro was destroyed in a battle with American battleships during the Battle of the Philippines.
11/12/44, the German "Tirpitz" collapses at the port under heavy rain.

"Bismarck" is based on "Hood". Climbing on board the battleship "Prinz Eugene"

1945 r_k

27.2.45 rubles, the German "Gneisenau" was destroyed in the port under heavy rain.
9.4.45 r, the German "Admiral Scheer" was lost in the port during the wind storm.
7.4.45 rub. The Japanese "Yamato" sank from the US naval aviation.
3.5.45 rubles, the German “Lüttzow” is in decline at the port under the hour of high water.
18.7.45 rub. Japanese "Haruna" of poverty at the port during the wind flood.
24.7.45 r., Japanese "Hyuga" depletion at the port under the hour of high wind.
28.7.45 r., Japanese "Ise" was depleted in the port under the hour of high water.

Pouches for line ships in Another World War

The list of lost ships of another world includes 32 battleships (to be recovered. Looking at the fact that the warring countries at that time had a total of 86 battleships, which is by no means small. Varto to be recovered, What about the beginning of the most terrible conflict of the 20th century? , The Linkoris were respected by such a “remaining argument” - they were treasured like the apple of an eye and introduced into the right only in extreme cases.

The remains of the Bismarck on the ocean floor

To clarify the reasons for the loss of battleships, we reject the following data:
Died in aviation: 19 approx. (59%) Against the fire of other battleships: 7 pcs. (21.8%) Sunk by underwater ships: 3 units (9%)
Died for other reasons: 2 pcs. (6%)
In other words, as a “remaining argument”, the battleships did not justify themselves at all - the left part of them was depleted for the help of a hundred times that they sacrificed for the flaming tension, water intensity and versatility. And if you take it to your honour, to endure a great number of trials, beggars, or perish, behind the great shell, without taking part in battle (“Arizona”, “Oklahoma”, “Brittany”, “Roma”, “Luttsov”, “Sheer”, “Tirpitz”, “Gneisenau”, “Haruna”, “Hyuga”, “Ise”, “Admiral Count Spee”, “Mutsu”, the unfortunate Greek battleships), and a number of others (“Yamato”, “Prince of Wales”) having not completed a tenth of the tasks assigned to them, they become wise - at the beginning of Another Light War, the class of line ships are hopelessly outdated and have become a relic of the past, with less real combat power .

There are not many battleships

35 years have passed, but the situation has suddenly changed, since the battle at sea has become a key factor in ensuring victory in the war. This happened at the rocks of Another World War on the Mediterranean Sea. Obviously, there were other theaters, where the fleet played an important role, for example the Pacific Ocean. Why would it be impossible to assert that the American fleet, with all its great advantages, has established a firm position there? No. Well, the Americans are not to blame for this, it’s just that the ocean itself is too big to be able to control it, the Japanese are still unable to carry out any operations. Vastness in the Mediterranean Sea after many closures, Regia Marina did not dare to stick her nose in the sea, which was disastrous for the establishment of the Axis armies in Southern Africa.

The leader of the nation, Benito Mussolini, had great success against the Wehrmacht, and after 9 months of fighting, they were about to enter the war, so they chanted: “To take a part from the world, it is necessary to take a part at the war." Or, to put it simply, they were afraid of being late until the bottom of the pie. On the very same day, on the 10th of 1940, Italy voiced the war of already defeated France and practically defeated England, recognizing Mussolina as such. The head pits gained control over the central part of the Mediterranean Sea, where communications took place that connected the Italian metropolis and Southern Africa. It would seem that this area would be controlled by the Italians, who are planning a large number of airfields to protect the great fleet. At the Mediterranean theater there were a lot of battles and other battles, but initially there were three divisions, in which the battleships played an important role, although to a different extent. There is talk about the battle at Punta Stilo, the attack of Taranto and the battle at Miss Matapan. Such events as the battle against Miss Teulada and the two battles at the capitol of Sirte played a much lesser role.

It seemed to be unclear that the Italian armored forces were completely unprepared for the war, having hired the fleet as such. On the right, out of 6 battleships that are on the lists, only 2, and the weakest ones, were ready for combat operations. They were confronted by 4 British battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet and the French "Lorrain", which was also stationed in Alexandria, and 4 French battleships in Toulon. On the 22nd of June, France capitulated, and the British were able to quickly fill the vacuum, so that when they arrived, the battle cruiser Hood and 2 battleships, as well as the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, were transferred to Gibraltar. Unfortunately, the first victims of the British battleships were the French allies in Mers-el-Kébir, but they did not have the chance to check with the real enemy for a long time. The Italians were preparing a convoy to Africa, with reinforcements for their army (2,200 soldiers, 72 tanks and other vehicles), and Admiral Canningham, who commanded the Mediterranean Fleet, organized two convoys from Malta, in order to bring out the best people and possess it. As a result, on the 9th day the fleet converged near the island of Punta Stilo.

Italian admiral Campioni mav battleri Cavour and Cesare, 6 important and 8 light cruisers, 20 destroyers. Admiral Cunningham of the battleship Warspite, Royal Sovereign, Malaya, aircraft carrier Gol, 5 light cruisers, 16 destroyers. It seemed that it would be possible to have a grandiose battle at the end of the Battle of Jutland, although there would be significantly fewer battleships, the future would soon be arranged differently. On the right is that the forward reconnaissance pilots of both opponents took over the ships that were at sea, and during which the Italian pilots killed as many as 4 battleships, which raised the alarm of the command. At the naval headquarters, Marshal Badoglio came to know, who, having returned to command the fleet with a proposal to send the new battleships “Litorio” and “Vitorio Veneto” to the sea, they had not yet been respected as combat-ready and before that they simply did not reach them. This is the case, so the proposition was inspired.

France 9 years ago, the Sunderland ships from Malta spotted the Italian fleet and began to follow it, but the Italian scouts missed the axis. The Italians could not admit that Cunningham would go straight to the shores of Italy, and they were looking for him for the day. Cunningham ordered the "Holka" to send torpedo bombers to attack the Italian battleships, but the "Swordfish" at 13.15 found out the most important cruisers, which unsuccessfully attacked. Admiral Paladin wrote that the British attacked well, and the Italian ships maneuvered simply miraculously.

This rejection told Admiral Campioni what to do next, and his cruiser was sent out to search for 6 seaplanes, as a result of which the British were discovered 80 miles away on a daylight approach, so that they could Drill up Campions from the bases. While the Italian commander did not make such a turn, he himself was eager for battle and heading towards the enemy. Cunningham, having met the Italians from Taranto, at about 14.15 now send word to the Italians. The English ships left in three groups: in front of the cruiser Admiral Tovi, 8 miles behind them was Cunningham himself on the Warspite with 5 destroyers, and another 8 miles behind the river were 2 battleships, an aircraft carrier and 10 destroyers. iv.

About 14.47 the light cruiser "Orion" spotted on the horizon, and then the British approached the Italian battleships 15 miles away. Admiral Towi turned back, the Italian light cruisers pursued him, and at 15:15 Cunningham ordered his vanguard to accept battle. At about 15.20, the cruisers began a firefight at a distance of 22,300 yards, which was plenty for a 152-mm gun, they could shoot at such a distance, they could get lost - just for the great luck. The explanation was clearly understood. One of the officers of the English cruiser Neptune famously stated that the weather, apparently, was ideal, but the wild splashes from the enemy shells, as well as the influence of the fire, did not allow hitting the target. This did not bother the cruiser to fire 136 shells in 10 weeks.

About 15.26 "Warspite" opened fire on the Italian light cruisers, and they began to arrive. Then, at 15.42, the battleships and important cruisers of Admiral Campioni turned for the day to assist their light cruisers. The important cruisers began firing at the Warspite first, and at 15.53 the duel of battleships began. In this case, Cunningham, even though he was eager to print, still did not lose his firmness. We got ahead of Tova, so that she wouldn’t get too excited about it, so that the Warspite would be ready to join up with other battleships.

The Italian admiral immediately praised the less dubious decision. His flagship “Cesare” fired at “Vorspite” from a distance of 29,000 yards, “Cavour” rejected the order to fire at “Malaya”, and stood up to what was already absolutely fantastic. Each time, the British battleship fired two test salvoes, but rejected such shortcomings that it immediately kicked the gunner. Warspite took aim at Cesare, and the British calculated the distance as 26,000 yards. There had been no hit yet, but the Italian overflows were lying in unwelcome proximity to the British destroyers, who were respected for the quickest return.

Having quickly lost the respect of Warspite's artillerymen, the important Italian cruisers again approached to fire at her, and at 15.55 "Trento" fired three salvos at the British flagship. Admiral Paladin's other ships engaged in a firefight with Tovi's cruisers, but without success.

The Italian spymen quickly settled a small sleeping area on board the Worspite and believed that this was a news of capture, although in reality there was a slight fire on the reconnaissance pilot after the salvo of the X. Litak was simply thrown overboard. And the axis “Warspite” himself was captured at “Cesari” at 15.59. The shell hit the rear dimar, breaking through a hole in it with a diameter of about 6 meters, and its head part flew into the side of the hull, deflected, hitting the side armor from the inner side. The damage itself turned out to be minor, but after half a week the fans were turned on in the boiler rooms of the department, and 4 boilers went well. The rate of "Cesare" fell to 18 knots. Cunningham proudly declared that the Warspite had achieved a record distance of 13 miles, and this was true: there are no more battleships available at such a distance, without having to do so.

Admiral Campioni believed that his flagship was seriously damaged and immediately ordered the left hand to be turned, interrupting the battle. The battle of the battleships has ended, and you have lost only 7 battles. Once again, we know that very smoothness, which was already mentioned, but here it can be explained not by the achieved results, but rather by the fearfulness of the Italian admiral - as before, having taken note of the fact that he stuck with 4 British lines cows. Meanwhile, by 16.45, the damage to the Cesare had already been corrected, and the ship was moving again. The shootout of the cruisers continued for another ten hours, and then the “Bolzano” took 3 losses from the “Neptune”, and one happened below the waterline. The cruiser took on nearly 3,000 tons of water and immediately spent hours, after which Admiral Paladin repeated the maneuver of his superior, withdrawing him from the battle.

The Italian destroyers covered the exit of important ships with smoke curtains and carried out a torpedo attack on the spot. If they fired from a distance of 5 to 8 miles, the British were unlikely to call this attack insignificant, although the Italians spent 32 torpedoes. The attack by the British destroyers was stifled at the very beginning by the fire of the Italian cruisers. Zahalom another Jutland bey is clearly not Viyshov. In one hour of battle, the British battleship fired 17 salvoes with its main caliber, the Cesare wasted 74 important shells, the Cavour – 41. The British cruisers also wasted shells, not at all economizing: Sydney – 411, Neptune – 51.

Fragments of the English blocked the roads to Taranto, the Italians deliberately attacked the Mesinskaya channel, which did not bother them at all. Cunningham decided to bypass the Italian smoke curtain from the night in order to renew the artillery battle, but at about 17.35 he had captured one thing that was visible from the place of “Warspite” - the shores of Calabre ii. Chantly, this was risikovano, but Churchill loved to call his admirals at the overworldly shore, it’s very easy to work with the Checkers mark, there’s a ton of shells that don’t reach a ton, and the admiral is just a trifle away , which dictates a healthy stomach. Ala Cunningham had a chance to witness the March attempts to catch up with the Swedish enemy, and then headed back to Alexandria.

And then the Italian pilots arrived at the same place, after which a form of comedy began, because the pilots bombed everything afterward, not recognizing whose ships were below. From 16.40 to 19.00, 76 bombers dropped their vantage on British ships, 50 on Italian ones from an altitude of 12,000 feet, otherwise there was no light. Here there were signs of one real shortcoming of the Italian aviation - the number of important bombs, with about 500 bombs, 8 were important 500 kg, the main ones were 250 and 100 kg, which obviously could not seriously damage the battleships. In the evening, the Italian ships hid in Augusta and Messina, and Cunningham calmly sailed to Malta.

The next day, Cunningham flew back to Alexandria, but before that he was able to revise another old theoretical problem. Late in the evening 10 June 9 "Swordfish" from "Golka" attacked Italian ships in the harbor of Augusta, they damaged a tanker and sank the destroyer "Leone Pancaldo". This attack can be carried out as a direct attack on Taranto, although the child “Gol” himself could not suffer a fate in this operation.

Italian propaganda tried to voice its victory at Punta Stilo, for which the newspapers published a picture of “Malaya” with obvious damage - a 102-mm installation and two 152-mm guns were broken. It was already quickly clear that this photograph had been taken back in 1936 after the severance of the battleship from a merchant ship.

The admiral's team tried to support the Mediterranean Fleet, Cunningham encouraged Somerville to bombard any Italian port, Naples, for example. However, Somerville remained modest and made a demonstrative exit to the shores of Sardinia. There, the 9th Line of the United Nations saw attacks by numerous Italian aircraft with the same results – either zero. But the idea of ​​shelling Italian ports was forgotten by the British admirals.

This battle, for all its apparent ineffectiveness, actually delivered important blows to two pre-war theories. All the admirals at that time believed that the general battle would turn into an artillery duel at a great distance. Theorists scrupulously identified the zones of free maneuvering of battleships under the fire of enemy shells, and issued recommendations on the standard “to conduct battles at distances from 22,180 to 24,115 yards on course turns from 157 to 234 degrees starboard.” In fact, these recommendations, as it turned out, did not cover the paper on which it was written. Tonnes of shells were carelessly thrown into the water for one or two hits, but they gave little. It turned out that the admirals were actually investing in the ridicule of Lady Luck, in the unfortunate “golden bag”. Despite the importance of upgrading fire-powered systems, the battleships could not effectively fire on a platform that exceeded 100 cables, not to mention cruisers. New confirmation of the collapse of this theory was the battle in the Java Sea in 1942 and the battle of the Commander Islands in 1943.

Billy Mitchell's theory also saw a number of great breakthroughs, although it would be difficult to call it unfounded. Even before the hour of their first traces, the sailors were honestly ahead of the curve: bombing ships on the move in the open sea is not at all the same as sinking intact targets. So it turned out: the horizontal bombers were unable to achieve anything in the fight against ships that were maneuvering.

Many times after the end of the war, new battles broke out around Punta Stilo. On the right, in his report to the Admiralty, Admiral Cunningham emphatically stated that the British fleet after this battle had lost a significant moral advantage, and English historians began to repeat this phrase with satisfaction. The Italian historian Marc-Antonio Bragadin exclaimed to the protege: “The English went to sea in order to inflict a decisive defeat on the Italians, but they did not succeed at all.” Nice line! The stinks did not defeat us, but they recognized the new failures... For several hours these points of view brought order, but now the apologists for the Italian fleet began to vehemently echo the thought of the English. As evidence of this, the study of Italian officers and admirals is found. Let us remember that facts are stubborn, and we will try to marvel at what happened next.

And then on the 17th September, 3 battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet carried out a massive shelling of the port of Bardia in Libya, which the Italians did not dare to attack. On September 30, the British fleet carried out a great operation by reinforcing from Gibraltar to Alexandria through the Sicilian Channel, which was “tightly blocked” by the Italian fleet and aircraft. The battleship "Valiant", the new armored aircraft carrier "Illustrious", 2 PPO cruisers and 4 destroyers passed away. The Italians first brought their entire fleet into the sea - 5 battleships, 10 cruisers and 34 destroyers. “At this moment, the Italian fleet was at the miraculous camp for its efficiency, combat readiness and fighting spirit,” writes the same Bragadin. For unknown reasons, Admiral Campioni did not dare to join forces with Cunningham, who owned only 2 battleships - “Warspite” and “Malaya”. Until that moment, the Royal Sovereign cars had been in such a miserable state that they were probably not near the sea. Before the speech, this was the reason why Cunningham asked for reinforcement, and not at all for the loss of strength, as the historians who we look at a little lower try to strengthen. Moreover, 5 battleships of Admiral Campioni, among which were the new “Vittorio Veneto” and “Littorio”, which had just entered into action, did not dare to stop two transports that would arrive at the site or to Malta from Oleksandria. Who has the moral superiority?

At the end of the fall of 1940, the Italian fleet had captured two boring problems, which left everything in its place. We are talking about the famous raid on Taranto on the night of 11/12 leaf fall and lesser notice, as well as the showy raid at Misu Teulada on 28 leaf fall.

All history buffs are miraculously familiar with the story of the attack of the British carrier aircraft on the Italian battleships, and the assessment of this operation has always been absolutely unambiguous. According to the Italian historian Bragadin, “The attack of Taranto had few immediate, but serious strategic consequences, since the Italian fleet lost only 2 battleships in service.” Antonio Tizzino agrees with him: “The shock of recognizing the Italian fleet without a fight on the night of 11/12 leaf fall indicated the nature of the impending war between Great Britain and Italy. Taranto has become the Italian Trafalgar." English historians, for example Stephen Roskill, do not disagree with them: “The success of the operation will be impressive, especially with the resolution of the small number of missions of the pilots.” Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani write: “The attack was brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed.” According to Jeffrey Till, Taranto completely changed the strategic situation.

However, there is a group of historians who can be wisely called Italorevisionists, who try to conclude that in Taranto the English recognized the greatest failures. Vidomius with his own veliyki peers James Sadkovich Polivvikhu, “Attack Taranto Snow did not Zomil to get the British to the Moral of Perevag, I did not call Zvsim Zrozumilo, the Vaughni Perevagi at the School Baseyn.” Alas, the look seems even faded and the weariness of others is evident.

The widely held idea that the British attack on Taranto was the greatest success with strategic results is completely false. The failure of the victorious and flexible powers created by this attack left little significant legacy, as the result resulted in the dislocation of the forces of the British fleet in literally all theatres. The failure of the English to carry out a major attack at Taranto made it difficult for them to sail on the Mediterranean Sea without ships, which were needed in other places.

The idea of ​​​​a torpedo attack on the fleet stationed at Taranto was born in 1935 during the Abyssinian crisis, however, it was only a development of the old ideas of Admiral Beatty, who was already preparing for additional ships in 1918 Torpedo bombers attack the Open Sea Fleet, which is gathered in Kili. In 1938, the commander of the aircraft carrier "Glories", Captain 1st Rank Lister, began to practice the same in 1940, presenting a further investigation plan to Admiral Cunningham.

Lister's plan, launching a night attack at moonlight, the torpedo bombers would attack the battleships that were in the outer roadstead, and the bombers would attack the ships in the inland and port shipping lanes. The attacking group consisted of two groups of 15 fighters each: 9 torpedo bombers and 6 bombers. There was one additional addition to Lister’s plan - the next night, a repeated attack was carried out with the forces of 15 aircraft: 6 torpedo bombers, 7 dive bombers and 2 lighters. The torpedo bombers arrived at sunset just before the end of the month, so the date of the attack was set depending on the phase of the month and the hour of the night light.

Then the British launched a complex strategic plan, linking the raid on Taranto with the immediate execution of several convoys and low-level other operations. These included convoys AN-6, MW-3, ME-3, operations “Coat” and “Crack”, the passage of the cruiser “Orion” to Piraeus with a special warehouse of the Royal Airborne Forces on board and, finally, a raid of cruisers to the Otran channel, by the sea 5 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, 30 destroyers and a number of transports were released. From here it is clear that Taranto’s attack was a completely cross approach.

The Italians relied on small depths in the harbor of Taranto, as they did not allow the enemy to fire torpedoes. They didn’t believe that the British were already making such evidence: the attack of the battleship “Richelieu” at Dakar, the attack of “Dunkirk” at Mars-el-Kebir, attacks of Italian ships at various ports. Paradoxically, although many of the successful operations of the "Swordfish" were due to their low speed characteristics, the torpedoes were launched at a low altitude and at low speed, so the first "low" after the launch was insignificant. In an experimental way, the British decided to install the Mk XII torpedo at a speed of 27 knots, instead of the original 40, the “low” would be minimal. Glibin's move was set at 33 feet, which was sufficient for Taranto, while Glibin's set at 42 feet.

Even before the start of the operation, the British released the aircraft carrier "Gol", which was to repair the damage, recovered from nearby bomb explosions during the attacks of the Italian aircraft. And although part of the fighters were transferred to “Illustrious”, the strike group looked unconvinced, especially since the British recognized the additional non-combat costs - 3 “Swordfish” broke up through the obstructed fire. As a result, the first fleet consisted of 6 torpedo bombers and 6 bombers, and the other – 5 torpedo bombers and 4 bombers, for a total of 21 flights. Of the 11 torpedoes dropped, five were sunk: three in the Litorio and one each in the Cavour and Duileo. Several torpedoes still got stuck in the dark days. In 60 bombs dropped, a quarter of them remained intact, including the bombs that sunk the cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio. The British spent only 2 flights, the pilots, who turned to the Illustrations, were ready to repeat the attack, but Cunningham did not attack his fleet.

And now we’ll get down to the crooks of the English counterfeiters, especially the scammers. The same James Sadkovich, who created the myth about the British victory and the “moral superiority”, adds to the evidence of a direct Anglo-American response against Regia Marina, as well as the Italian fleet without dying at Taranto and without losing the battleship forever . Cavour simply could not be repaired; the war ended quickly.

According to a number of historians, Admiral Cunningham made a number of crude concessions during the planned and carried out operation. For example, if a normal military operation transfers developments to success, then why didn’t the British prevent the next blow from coming? Another benefit was that only 2 flights were seen for the Vitorio Veneto attack, which was completely insufficient. The destruction of both current battleships would have put the Italian fleet at a real disadvantage, but at the same time at its best. This version of participation in the attack on the Ark Royal is presented. The aircraft carrier could quickly arrive at a rendezvous with Cunningham's fleet, passing through the Sicilian Channel, and work closely with the Illustrious. Most of the pilots of “Illustrious” act little in the role of group leaders. Another option for the recovery of the Ark Royal could be to try to dig up the entire battleships in the Messinian Protocy, the remains of the exit from a safe base on the exit coast of Italy would be obvious.

Apparently, Cunningham was able to vikorize much more quickly, and then he was to vikorist all the “Swordfish” as torpedo bombers, not allowing them to carry out other tasks, which were all failed. i. In a word, Cunningham did not convey, did not comprehend, did not guess, did not organize, did not think, did not vikor...

A miraculous proof of the failure of the attack on Taranto was the fact that the British, as before, could not conduct convoys through the Mediterranean Sea and were in danger of dragging them across the Cape of Good Hope. Of the 21 transports that crashed from England to the Middle East until the 18th century, less than five managed to appear in the Mediterranean Sea. The threat of Italian battleships shackled all British actions after Taranto.

Another evidence of the failure of the British plans was the sharp increase in transportation to Libya, which ensured the successful offensive of Rommel’s army. From early 1940 to early 1941, the number of delivered goods increased, and since they were not all available to support the Afrika Korps, the fault of which was not the Italian fleet.

The British were openly afraid of the Italian fleet, so until the summer of 1941 they stationed 5 of their battleships on the Mediterranean Sea (in Gibraltar, 4 in Alexandria), because the warehouse of the Metropolitan Fleet lost only 3 ships of this class.

Taranto's attack once again brought home what was so obvious: English pilots are manly people. The operation was soon to be taken into account, since the British command and Admiral Cunningham were still unable to complete the three most important tasks. They were unable to complete the decline of the Italian battleships. They didn’t know how to destroy the infrastructure of the bases that provided support for the battle fleet, sea defense, and dry docks near Genoa. They were unable to ensure the free passage of their convoys through the Mediterranean Sea.

The axis of this explanation from Taranto conveys to us Italian revisionism. Be patient with them no matter what - don’t let your skin change itself.

At the end of the leaf fall, the Union left Gibraltar to carry out 3 transports to Malta, and at the same time it was planned to transport through the Sicilian Channel a few ships of the Mediterranean Fleet, which were going to England for repairs. Pay attention to the fact that the English were active in the center of the Mediterranean, an area that is theoretically under the complete control of the Italians. Before the Union, Admiral Somerville included the battle cruiser "Rinaun", the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal", 4 light cruisers and 9 destroyers, when the Union D collapsed - the battleship "Remillis", 3 cruiser and, 5 destroyers. Admiral Cunningham coldly reports that his flagship Warspite, which escorted the United States D, cruised near Sicily for many days without taking a fatal shot.

The Italians discovered British ships, and on the 26th of November the battleships “Vittorio Veneto” and “Giulio Cesare” left Naples, 6 important cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Admiral Campioni, on Svitanka 27 leaf fall, stinks swirled around the flooded edge. razvidniki. They reported that Somerville does not have aircraft carriers, and Campione is on the alert for Spoluchennaya N. However, he has an order: “Do not fight with the enemy, since there is a clear advantage... It is difficult to detect an aggressive spirit and remember that it is difficult and a replenishment of expenses for military ships under The hour of war requires us to calmly analyze the severity of the skin battle. However, the possibility of spending does not mean justification during the battle or immediately after the cob.” In a word, read it however you want.

The Campiones knew that all British ships would pass through the Sicilian channel, but would not dare to cross the junction between the two English corrals. However, the reconciliations in the reports confused the plans of both admirals. "Swordfish" of "Ark Royal" at 8.52 reported that they were leaving 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers for 65 miles for the day's launch, but this radiogram was delayed for an entire year. About 10:15 the next flight, having discovered the Italian battleships, "Rinaun" increased its speed to 28 knots and loads on them, depriving the aircraft carrier of a couple of destroyers.

Reports from Italian pilots were also late and inaccurate. Admiral Campioni said: “The large number of ships discovered by the Bolzano flight escaped from the fact that a destroyer struck Miss Bon at night. However, the stench was very far away, but it was still possible, based on the information of the destroyer, that the English unit had turned back through the Khvylin after contact.” And yet, at 10:45, the wind turned to daylight and increased the speed to 18 knots, without suspecting the presence of Unity D. The English squadrons met at 11:30, and after a while and Somerville selected the largest battleships and turned to the south. Meanwhile, the Italians began to stir up, the fragments of Campioni had a chance to collect their pens, which had disintegrated, but they could not get back to work, and at 12.20 the important cruisers started firing on the English lines. racers, although Campioni had emphatically broadcast the most urgent order over the radio: “Do not enter , “Do not join, I repeat, do not join the battle.”

In just two weeks, the cruiser "Berwick" snatched a stray shell from the barbette "Y", and at 12.24 "Rinaun" opened fire for the Italians from a distance of 26,500 yards. "Remillis", for the sake of fear, having fired two volleys, just like "Malaya" in the battle at Punta Stolo, he could no longer watch the battle from afar. The doctrine of daylight combat at great distances saw a new and brutal test and did not see it again. Approximately 20 of the cruisers exchanged salvos, but the only success was that another shell hit the Berwick, which reduced the stern section. It’s a pity that “Rinaun” did not catch up with its cruisers and especially the Italian ones. True, it was just about 12:45 that the salvo was fired at the cruiser Trento, but the distance had already increased to 30,700 yards, which meant that there was no hope for the changes.

At about 12.40 British aircraft entered the battle - 11 Swordfish attacked the Vitorio Veneto. Although the torpedoes were fired from a distance of no more than 800 yards, there was no hit. This misfortune has also become a rich tradition of Mediterranean battles. Although the Italians were already afraid of British torpedo bombers, they showed excellent results even in the fight against ships standing at the port, in the open sea their successes were less modest.

About 12.50, the Renown ice did not shoot two French liners, which stopped at the wrong time in the wrong place, and arrived at about 12.50 after marking the Italian battleships. The prospect of such a battle did not reassure him, and Somerville turned back in the afternoon, ahead of the Remillis, noticing that the Italians themselves had turned back, Somerville rushed in pursuit, and the English cruisers were destroyed by the same ones.

The wonderful game was played out in a heartbeat. “Vitorio Veneto”, going on duty, managed to fire a couple of salvos at enemy cruisers, the combat debut of the new battleship was made. I am once again in awe of Admiral Campioni’s words: “When the distance has shortened to 32,000 yards, I turn the chase from the stern and follow the correct course to get closer to the cruisers. As the distance shortened to 28,000 yards (the maximum distance for the Cesare shell), I turned to the right to shoot with the whole side.” In short, if they had caught up with me, then I would have... But the British cruisers, quite reasonably, did not understand the share and pulled out, the distance of the mitt increased to 40,000 yards, and went quiet on its own.

Zagalom, as one middle-aged historian wrote: “The unstoppable army of the great ruler valiantly raised the flag of attack. The liquid enemy, wrapped in fear in his cloak, sneakily followed them to the walls of our capital.”

Subsequent actions escalated to mutual fruitless air attacks. About 15.30 "Swordfish" attacked the Italian cruisers, about 15.35 they themselves destroyed the Skua bombers, then the Italian S-79 bombers tried to hit the "Ark Royal". The vibrations of the bombs were very effective and not at all effective.

What were the results of this battle? The Italian cruisers spent 660 203-mm shells, reaching as many as 2 days, or 0.3 hundred. “Vitorio Veneto” fired 19 volleys with its main caliber, “Rinaun” - only 16, and there were no hits. A long-distance daytime artillery battle increasingly turned into a chimera. Oh, and not to forget, another result of the battle was the investigation of Admiral Somerville, who initiated Churchill. In my opinion, Somerville did not show sufficient aggressiveness and tenacity. The Italians soon squandered their miracle reward by defeating the weak British forces, for which they paid dearly. By the cruel fate of 1941, the British fleet had given the enemy a complete blunder, and the old and weak battle cruiser "Rinaun" again played a leading role.

After the bitter pressure that he had left London, Admiral Somerville was about to show incredible activity, demonstrating that his union had been established. The decision to shell Gena and the adjacent military-naval base of Livorno was praised. Already this one idea showed that the English would not value the Italian fleet at a penny, and even the “Vittorio Veneto”, which, having lost its damage, would be necessary to protect Somerville’s union.

On the 8th, the Italian command learned that a British aircraft carrier was sailing off the Balearic Islands that afternoon. The Italians believed that a terrible operation was being prepared with the transfer of aircraft to Malta, but they immediately rejected an unpleasant surprise. On February 9, at about 7.14, important shells fell on Genoa. "Rinaun", "Malaya" and the light cruiser "Shefield" fired 273 shells of 381-mm caliber and 782 152-mm shells from a range of 18,000 to 21,000 yards at the site and port. They managed to sink 5 transports and destroyed another 18 ships. The battleship Cayo Duileo, which was being repaired at the shipyard, was not damaged. The Italian coastal batteries looked very different: 2 – 381-mm, 2 – 190-mm and 8 – 152-mm harmat, they couldn’t produce anything against the stench, but the truth was found out - a rank fog. True, some of the shells sunk to the spot, and 144 individuals died. Ale Somerville mauled, saying: “Behind all the good news, Genoa took a terrible garna rag.”

Now the United Nations faced a different, no less complicated task - to get in without giving up “an incredibly good beating.” On the right is that on this day in Sardinia the cruising fleet of Vice Admiral Iachino (having replaced the unfortunate and fearful Admiral Campioni) at the warehouse of the battleships “Vitorio Veneto”, “Doria” and “Cesare”, 3 important cruisers and 10 destroyers. As soon as the news about the shelling of Genoa was lost, he immediately went to the rescue, but then the command let him down. The fleet headquarters gave him the wrong coordinates, confusing the British squadron and the innocent French convoy. As a result, the opponents never fought each other, although at any moment the line between the two fleets did not exceed 90 miles.

On the 11th of February, the Union turned clear to Gibraltar, without removing the grime. The British again quickly realized that they themselves must remain outside and unguarded in the Mediterranean Sea, which would threaten the Italian fleet not in sight. It’s true that Somerville himself spoke from this account as follows: “Angel-protector, before which I always put myself in great esteem, obviously, being in a garish mood.”

Now we smoothly move on to the third iconic stage at the Mediterranean Theater, and before the battle we will beat Miss Matapan. Before speaking, if we take the Italian point of view, we will have to know that in fact there was not one, but two battles, and the book of one of the main battles of Admiral Angelo Iachino is called - Gaudi e Matapan , then “Battles at Gavdos” Matapana." It is also true that all the right-wing Italian revisionists unanimously rally behind this battle (no, no, no harm, you thought so) of the Germans, who were thirsty for the Italian fleet if they wanted any oh, that's more, when I turned up. The British army in Greece had experienced one defeat after another, and it became possible to cut them off, resulting in further destitution. For this purpose, the Italians needed to launch an incursion into the Crete region and defeat the British forces that had arrived. The Germans decided to help their spy pilots. And they got it!

Evening of the 26th from Naples, the battleship "Vitorio Veneto" was ensigned by Admiral Angelo Iachino. Already at sea, a number of divisions of cruisers and destroyers had already been acquired; in total, the ordered Italian admiral received 1 battleship, 6 important ones, 2 light cruisers, and 13 destroyers. The plan of the operation was that two divisions of cruisers would search the dry coast of Crete, as well as the Vitorio Veneto, simultaneously with escorting ships from the cruising island of Gavdos, from the rainy coast. Krita.

After the British radio survey had reached its peak, the famous “Enigma” was performing, and Admiral Cunningham learned that the enemy was now beginning, then on the evening of the 27th of February from Alexandria, Union A – battleship “B” entered the sea orspite", "Barem", "Veliant", new aircraft carrier “Formidable” and 4 destroyers. Over the past few years, the port has been deprived of 3 – 5 more destroyers. In this way, the British were able to deceive the Axis agents, with whom Alexandria was literally swarming. At sea there was already a squadron of Vice Admiral Prudham-Vippel - 4 light cruisers and 4 destroyers.

On the 27th day, British pilots spotted Yakino's squadron, and they themselves also noted. After some time, the Italian command ordered the operation to continue, since aerial reconnaissance reported that the British battleships were calmly anchored, but the operation plan was nevertheless changed. The raid of cruisers on the snowy birch of Crete was stopped, and the entire squadron was unable to sail to the island of Gavdos.

About 6.00 "Vitorio Veneto" and the cruiser "Bolzano" were picked up for reconnaissance of the hydroplane Ro-43, and immediately after they marked the British cruisers approximately 40 miles away for a late approach from the Italian squadron . The Italians once again had a good opportunity to achieve success, and Admiral Iachino, having ordered the 3rd divisions of cruisers of Admiral Sansonetti to catch up with the British, "Vitorio Veneto" increased its speed to 28 nodes to support them. The Formidable flights discovered Italian cruisers, but Predham-Vippel doubted his report, believing that the pilots were destroying his powerful ships. However, at 8.00 all doubts were cleared up when Italian cruisers were spotted that night.

Pridham-Vippel suddenly turned around and at speed 30 knots rushed to join the lead forces, which were 90 miles behind them. On 8.12 the Italian important cruisers opened fire, but the distance was too great - over 26,000 yards - and the shells fell short. The advantage of the Italians in the Swedish market was minimal, and although they were harassing the English, it was necessary to do so. At about 8:29, the British cruiser Gloucester fired three salvos, and her 152-mm shells no longer reached the enemy. The Italians continued the ineffective fire, wasting 445 203-mm shells, until about 8.55 Yakino ordered the pursuit to begin. Soon, fighting at long distances will result in a waste of ammunition.

Admiral Cunningham was at this point trying to get back to the wealth of information he had received so far, but at 9.39 he gave up on everything and ordered the Formidebla to scramble to attack the Italian cruisers. . The aircraft carrier was a formidable force, in its hangar there were as many as 27 aircraft (despite the fact that ships of this type could take up to 36 aircraft). About 10.00 the stench was strong - 6 torpedo bombers "Albacore", a scout "Swordfish" and 2 destroyers "Fulmar". Behind the shadows of the Pacific War, it was funny, but in the Mediterranean both the English and the Italians believed that it was rich and scary.

Admiral Yakino this hour solved approximately the same riddles. Air reconnaissance on 9.13 informed you that 1 aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 9 cruisers and 14 destroyers of the enemy were located at the same time as the same year! The admiral decided not to lose respect for such an attack and try to squeeze the English cruisers into pincers. For this reason, having punished Sansonetti, he followed the wrong course, and he himself, on Vittorio Veneto, tried to cut Pridham-Vippel out. The plan was good, but it didn’t work out, because the English were much better off, but they didn’t pass it on to Yakino.

And yet, the British cruisers were sunk for a reason, when Vittorio Veneto appeared on the horizon, one of the officers at the headquarters of Predham-Wippel naively asked: “What kind of battleship? I thought that our people were far away.” At about 10.55 there was an ambiguous confirmation of the 381-mm gun salvo. The English cruisers again turned to the return course and set off in full speed towards Canningham.

And then the letaki appeared on the stage. Having recovered the battleship, the pilots immediately forgot about the cruisers, and at about 11.18 the strike group landed on the left beam of Vittorio Veneto. The problems that small English pilots faced were unknown to pilots from other countries. “We had a wind speed of 30 knots, at our altitude there was a sharp wind with a force of 30 knots, so we, looming a wind speed of 90 knots, were approaching with a wind speed of 30 knots.” Then the British torpedo bombers went on the attack for a little more than the torpedo boats. All the torpedoes went through, but the attack ended the aggressive mood of the Italian admirals, turning home. However, I can’t help but believe that the English are richer in the future, but in truth, they are not in a hurry. As a result, before the dark, British pilots were forced to carry out another 8 attacks, and before the carrier-based pilots, bombers and torpedo bombers from coastal airfields joined in, in total, 48 pilots took part in these attacks, which is a good indication of the British malaise and aviation. I repeat that in the Pacific Ocean such forces were at work at the warehouse of one shock wave.

Most of the attacks were ineffective, but only once on the river and the club fired, then on 15.10 one torpedo sank into the stern of Vittorio Veneto, damaging the left guints. The battleship unnecessarily spent a move, and then completed the shvidko on the right screws, giving 19 knots. Cunningham, fooled by the overoptimistic pilots, rushed in pursuit.

At the same time, it became clear to everyone that this was a waste of time, and at 16.44 he ordered Predham-Vippela to catch up and prevent damage to the Italian battleship, having given his cruisers 9 destroyers. However, it was dark, so it was not happy for the English to escape the situation. During the final attack of torpedo bombers, one of them released the same “golden bullet” that in the spring of 1941 determined the result of several naval battles. The heavy cruiser "Pola" avoided a torpedo hit and lost steam.

At this moment, the admirals of both sides were waiting for themselves without realizing the situation that had exactly developed. The English misjudged the rate and liquidity of the Italian ships, and the Italians had no idea where the English battleships were located. Once Yakino found out about this, he sent Vice Admiral Cattaneo’s 1st division of cruisers to help “Field”, including the injured ship. I thought that the British ships discovered by the pilots were the cruiser Pridham-Wippel, with which the important cruiser Cattaneo could meet without difficulty. Cattaneo himself hesitated that it would be better to send 2 destroyers to the “Field”, but Yakino ordered the admiral to go there himself.

The comedy of mercy continued. About 8.15, the Orion radar detected a cruiser that was standing idle, but Predham-Vippel determined that it was a sad battleship, and deprived it of the destroyers, and he and the cruisers set off for an early approach in search of another and Italian ships. However, the captain of the 1st rank, who commanded the destroyers, Mac did not reject his order and continued to follow the correct course. Paradoxically, the untouched cruiser was denied the chance to survive! Well, we’re not talking about “Vitorio Veneto” anymore, because it’s not at all where the English wanted to find it, and we’re now out of luck. Then, having completed the battle of the island of Gavdos, in front of the battle of the island of Matapan.

At about 21.50, Admiral Cattaneo sent the remaining radiogram: “The distance that the Alfieri division has lost is already surrounded and does not allow a battle, which, I think, will be as strong as possible.” The admiral said that there would be a day to come, as long as the Piv was in tow. At the same time, the Ajax radar spotted Cattaneo's ship, aka Predham-Vippel, and I decided to abandon the Maka destroyer and turn away further, so as not to enter into battle with “our own.” Mack, having dug through Ajax’s information, also believed that the cruiser would tank her, as a result of which Cattaneo calmly licked between the two English paddocks! As you know, the famous battle appears to be a Lanzug of mutual brutal pardons.

About 10.10 p.m., the Valiant radar detected a position where we could stand still for 6 miles on the day's approach. Just an hour later, the cruisers Cattaneo were approaching the “Field”, and the crew of the “Fiume” was preparing to take their comrade in tow. The night was monthless and gloomy, so the visibility did not exceed 5000 yards. If from the “Pidlogi” they spotted vague silhouettes at night, they believed that theirs had fired a red rocket, from the “Zorya” they marked this rocket left-handed on the course and turned in that direction. And at this moment, Admiral Cunningham created a maneuver like no other genius. Breaking all traditions and instructions, turning your important ships towards the enemy. Due to the presence of radar in the English and its presence among the Italians, there was little risk, it was unacceptable even for those who had “Formideble” in the underground colony between “Veliant” and “Barem”.

So far the English had not tanked Cattaneo's ships, but if they were marked, Cunningham wasted no time in moving his battleships back to the wake of the column. Before speaking, the echidna’s food is to blame here: what is the British radar up to here? Admiral Cattaneo's cruiser was revealed visually. “Formideble” hastily left the camp, so as not to appear caught before an artillery battle that was unacceptable to him.